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2 RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ITS RESILIENCE
Credit risk
Lending by deposit institutions corresponding to their business in Spain fell by 3.9% 
year-on-year in December 2018. Lending by Spanish banks stood at €1.15 trillion in 
December 2018, having decreased by 3.9%, at a faster pace than in 2017 (see Chart 2.1.A). 
As shown in Chart 2.2, this greater deleveraging was across the board in institutions, both 
in terms of total credit and that extended to non-financial corporations. However, part of the 
decline is explained by the sale of NPL portfolios by some institutions. If NPLs are excluded 
from the analysis, the decline would be just 1.8%.
New credit in the past year increased by 11 %, compared with 2017. In keeping with the 
favourable macroeconomic conditions of the past year, the volume of new credit grew at a 
notable pace, albeit insufficient to offset repayments. In the past year, lending to households 
and non-financial corporations, either through new loans or an increase in the principal 
drawn down in existing loans, amounted to €441 billion (see Chart 2.1.B).
The volume of new credit grew in a setting of favourable credit supply conditions, in 
terms of interest rates and loan approval rates. Interest rates on new loans remained 
stable in 2018, with a narrow spread of 1 pp between loans of different sizes to firms, and 
a spread of 6 pp between the rate of new consumer loans and that of loans for house 
purchase. Interest rates on loans to firms amounting to less than €1 million continued their 
downward trend of recent years, with a decline of approximately 34 bp, while for larger 
loans, the interest rates remained slightly above 1.5% (see Chart 2.3.A). In the case of 
households, no significant changes were observed in the interest rates on loans for house 
2.1 Deposit institutions
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Before 2017 information was not available on the increase in the principal drawn down in existing loans. Consequently, the first data for this series, accumulated 
over twelve months, is represented in December each year. The rate of change shown only refers to new loans.
Total credit continued to decrease to €1.15 trillion in December 2018 (-3.9% compared with December 2017). New loans in the twelve months of 2018 
grew by 8.8% compared with the previous year, total new credit (new loans plus an increase in the principal drawn down) reached €441billion, after this 
aggregate grew by 11% in the last year.
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purchase or consumption (see Chart 2.3.B). Analysis of new loan applications by non-
financial corporations in 2018 reveals that the number has declined somewhat, but that the 
approval rate has increased slightly, by as much as 1 pp, compared with the approval rate 
of 33% observed at end-2017.
Over the past year forborne loans decreased at the same rate as in 2017. The volume 
of forborne loans stood at €69.5 billion in December 2018, down 21% year-on-year. This 
was largely due to the 24.2% decrease in the volume of forborne loans of non-financial 
corporations.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The graph shows the density function (or frequency distribution) of the year-on-year rate of change in credit for Spanish deposit institutions, weighted by the credit 
corresponding to each institution. This density function is approximated through a kernel estimator which allows a non-parametric estimate of the density function, 
yielding a continuous and smoothed graphical representation of that function.
Credit to the resident private sector declined across institutions, both in terms of total credit and that extended to non-financial corporations. This is 
observed in the shift to the left in both distributions.
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a The new loans of a period are defined as all the first-time loans arranged with customers and all the contracts existing in earlier periods whose amount, interest 
rate, maturity or other significant financial conditions in relation to interest rates have been renegotiated with customers in the month in question.
Interest rates on new loans remained stable during 2018. The spread on new business with large and small firms stood at approximately 1 pp in 
December 2018, considerably lower than the 3 pp recorded in 2013. The rate for new consumer loans to households held at above 8%, with a spread 
of approximately 6 pp over loans for house purchase.
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In December 2018, the NPL ratio of the resident private sector stood at 5.8%, 
quickening the pace of decline of recent years. This ratio is the lowest observed since 
December 2010, following a decline of 207 bp in the past year and of 814 bp since December 
2013, when the highest NPL ratio of the whole series was recorded (see Chart 2.4). The fall 
in the NPL ratio was the result of the sharp decline observed in non-performing assets in 
recent years. In particular, since December 2013, non-performing assets have decreased 
by more than €122 billion, which accounts for 64.5% of the total. In the past year, they have 
declined by €27.5 billion (-29.1%). As mentioned above, the decrease was largely due to 
the sale by some institutions of asset portfolios linked to construction and real estate 
activities. These declines were related to some extent to the intense pressure exerted by 
supervisors in recent years. 
Over the past year, new NPLs decreased, NPLs written off remained stable and NPL 
recoveries and sales increased notably. Chart 2.5 shows a breakdown of NPL movements. 
New NPLs accounted for 27.3% of the initial volume of NPLs in 2018. Write-offs remained 
at 13.6% of total NPLs at the beginning of the period, although it should not be overlooked 
that, in absolute terms, they also fell significantly. Lastly, recoveries, which include 
foreclosed assets and NPLs sold to third parties, rose notably in absolute terms, to account 
for 42.8% of the amount at the beginning of 2018.
The downward trend in the volume of foreclosed assets was also more pronounced this 
year, to a large extent due to wholesale portfolio sales. The decline in foreclosed assets, 
which began in 2014, was appreciably more pronounced in 2018. From December 2017 to 
December 2018, the volume of these assets decreased by more than €20 billion, representing 
a year-on-year decline of more than 30% (see Chart 2.6.A).1 In 2019, confirmation of the 
announced portfolio sales will further reduce the volume of foreclosed assets. By type, most 
foreclosed assets relate to construction and real estate development (see Chart 2.6.B), followed 
by assets stemming from lending to households for house purchase (more than 26%).
1  Wholesale sales have been conducted, in most cases, through a joint venture set up between the selling bank 
and the buyer, with the joint venture as the recipient of the real estate assets subject to the transaction. The se-
lling bank keeps a minority interest in the joint venture’s capital. The impact of foreclosed real estate assets on 
the selling bank’s balance sheet is significantly reduced as only the value of the holding in the joint venture is 
considered, instead of the whole value of the foreclosed assets.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
The NPL ratio of the resident private sector continued the decline observed in recent years and reached 5.8% in December 2018, down by more than 2 
pp on the same month of the previous year.
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In short, the credit quality of business in Spain has continued to improve, made 
possible by an accommodative monetary policy and driven by favourable macroeconomic 
conditions and supervisory pressure. In this regard, the risks affecting the potential growth 
of the Spanish economy identified in this FSR are factors that will significantly influence the 
continuation of this positive development.
The consolidated assets of Spanish deposit institutions stood at €3,550 billion in 
2018, a year-on-year increase of 0.5% (Annex 1). This slight increase in consolidated 
assets was the result of the performance of business abroad, where financial assets 
(mainly loans) rose by 2.8% year-on-year and, to a lesser extent, of business in Spain, 
where financial assets grew by 0.3%. The greater geographical diversification led 
to financial assets abroad accounting for 48% of consolidated financial assets in 
December 2018.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Shown beside each bar is the percentage each item represents of the total NPLs at the beginning of the period. NPLs recovered include non-performing loans 
that become performing again, foreclosed assets and NPLs sold to third parties.
With respect to the previous year, in 2018 new NPLs decreased, NPLs written-off remained stable and NPLs recovered, which include those sold to third 
parties, increased notably. As a result, the total volume of NPLs decreased by €27.5 billion.
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In 2018 the downward trend in foreclosed assets, which began in 2014, became more pronounced. Foreclosed assets have decreased by more than 
€20 billion with respect to December 2017, representing a year-on-year fall of more than 30%.
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Spanish and US banks have the highest exposure to the United Kingdom and may 
therefore be more affected by the uncertainty surrounding Brexit (see Chart 2.7.A). 
Spain is the European country with the highest exposure to the United Kingdom, followed 
by Germany and France. However, the exposure of Spanish banks to the United Kingdom 
arises from the activity of subsidiaries with financial autonomy and a retail-oriented business 
model. This means that the main risk of a disorderly Brexit for Spanish banks is the potential 
deterioration of the British economy, although this risk has recently eased as a result of the 
agreement reached with the European Council to delay Brexit until 31 October 2019. The 
activity abroad of Spanish banks is mainly concentrated in Europe and Latin America and, 
to a lesser extent, in the United States and Turkey. Particularly noteworthy in the period 
2014-2018 is the growth in loans to the rest of Europe (excluding exposure to the United 
Kingdom), from 19.8% in December 2014 to 27.9% in December 2018, contrasting with the 
decrease in loans to Latin America, which fell by 7.6 pp to 25.1% in December 2018 
(see Chart 2.7.B).
Consolidated non-performing assets, including loans and debt securities, decreased 
by 14.4% year-on-year (see Annex 1). The decrease in the volume of consolidated non-
performing assets pushed the total non-performing assets ratio down to 3.2 %, a 
decrease of 61 bp with respect to that recorded in December 2017 (3.8 %). In the case of 
loans abroad, this decrease was across the board, except in Turkey (+1.2 pp, to 5%) and 
the United States (+0.3 pp, to 1.9%). The largest decreases were observed in Portugal 
(–1.5 pp to 4.6%) (see Chart 2.8.A). 
The non-performing loans ratio of Spanish banks is slightly higher than the European 
average. According to the data published by the European Central Bank in its consolidated 
banking statistics, over the past year, Spanish banks reduced their NPL ratio by 0.5 pp, 
to stand at 3.9% in September 2018 (the latest available data), compared with 3.3% in 
Europe. Ireland, Italy and Portugal are the countries which have reduced their NPL ratio 
SOURCES: BIS and Banco de España.
a Panel A shows the outstanding balance of loans based on the direct counterparty according to the consolidated banking statistics (CBS) of the BIS.
b Panel B shows the relative weight at each date of the loans in each geographical area as a percentage of total loans outside Spain.
The exposure of foreign banks to the United Kingdom in September 2018 is similar to that of UK banks. The United States (8.5%) and Spain (8.1%) have the 
highest exposure among foreign banks to the United Kingdom which concentrates more than 25% of the loans abroad of Spanish deposit institutions. 
Particularly noteworthy in the period 2014-2018 is the growth in loans to Europe (excluding the United Kingdom) and the decrease in the weight of loans to 
Latin America.
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the most, by about 2 pp (see Chart 2.8.B), although they remain significantly above the 
European average. 
Liquidity and financing conditions
The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) measures the short-term resilience of Spanish 
deposit institutions faced with withdrawals of funds. Specifically, the LCR compares the 
stock of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) that may be easily and quickly converted into 
cash (liquidity), with the net outflows of funds that institutions would have to address in an 
adverse scenario (set by the regulator) lasting 30 days. The regulatorily required level for 
this ratio must be above 100%, that is, institutions must always have sufficient liquid assets 
to cope with outflows of funding under a stress scenario of 30 days. 
In December 2018, the aggregate LCR stood at 170%, well above the regulatory 
minimum. Chart 2.9.A shows how the LCR has generally trended upwards since 2016, to 
stand at 170%, driven by the build-up of liquid assets, since the denominator of the ratio 
remained relatively stable. By institution, Chart 2.9.B shows the slight shift to the right of the 
distribution between 2017 and 2018, evidencing that a larger number of institutions had a 
higher level of this ratio in December 2018.
The LCR of Spanish institutions was slightly higher than the European average in 
December 2018. In particular, based on the data published quarterly by the European 
Banking Authority in its risk dashboard,2 the ratio in Spain was 162.3%, compared with the 
European average of 152% (see Chart 2.10), lower than the ratio observed in the United 
Kingdom, but higher than those of the rest of the large EU economies.
Monetary policy developments in the euro area affect the liquidity and financing 
conditions of the wholesale funding market. The expansionary monetary policy applied 
2 See http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/risk-dashboard
SOURCES: Banco de España and ECB.
a The NPL ratio in Greece is 43.5% (45% in December 2017).
The NPL ratio abroad decreased in 2018 in the main countries where Spanish deposit institutions are present, except for in Turkey and the United 
States. The NPL ratio stands between 5% in Turkey and 0.6% in France. In Europe the NPL ratio also continued to fall and reached 3.3% in 
September 2018.
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by the ECB since June 2014 has led to an increase in the Eurosystem’s balance sheet 
(from €2,000 billion to €4,700 billion,3 see Chart 2.11.A), mainly due to its purchase 
programme, which recently underwent changes. From January 2019, the ECB will only 
reinvest the principal payments from maturing securities. In March 2019, the ECB announced 
that it would continue to make funding available to credit institutions through the Eurosystem 
and that it would maintain the current benchmark rates throughout 2019. 
Funding provided by the Eurosystem to the Spanish banking sector in recent years 
has been very high. The Eurosystem provides liquidity through its asset purchase 
programmes and its refinancing operations, amounting to €2,635 billion and €728 billion, 
respectively, in April 2019. Almost all of the refinancing granted by the Eurosystem to date 
(€719 billion)4 has consisted of four targeted longer-term refinancing operations known as 
TLTRO-II, which have provided banks with stable, long-term funding with very favourable 
conditions. Spanish banks have obtained funding amounting to nearly €168 billion,5 which 
accounts for 23% of the total liquidity received by all Eurosystem banks (see Chart 2.11.B) 
and slightly more than 15% of Spain’s GDP. Spanish banks, together with Italian banks, are 
those that have relied the most on these TLTRO-II operations to obtain long-term refinancing.
According to the measures announced by the Governing Council of the ECB in March 
2019, banks will be able to obtain abundant funding through the Eurosystem for an 
extended period of time. Specifically, the ECB confirmed that the regular one-week and 
three-month lending operations will continue to be executed at a fixed rate with full allotment 
of banks’ requests for liquidity, only subject to having sufficient collateral, at least until 
3  The surplus liquidity in the system increased from €200 billion to €1,851 billion in the same period. Of this 
amount, €1,265 billion relates to excess reserves and €586 billion to the deposit facility.
4 The remainder, €9 billion, related to the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations.
5  Of this amount, €115.6 billion were granted in June 2016, €41.5 billion in March 2017, and the rest (€10 billion) 
in September and December 2017.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The aggregate LCR at each date is calculated as the sum of the HQLAs of all institutions divided by the sum of net liquidity outflows of all institutions.
b The panel shows the density function (or frequency distribution) of the LCR for Spanish deposit institutions, weighted by net cash outflows corresponding to each 
institution. This density function is approximated through a kernel estimator which allows a non-parametric estimate of the density function, yielding a continuous 
and smoothed graphical representation of that function.
The LCR of Spanish deposit institutions has risen since it began to be measured in September 2016, driven by the build-up of liquid assets. The 
distribution across institutions has varied slightly in the last year towards a higher level of the ratio.
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March 2021.6 Moreover, it decided to launch a new series of quarterly operations, starting in 
September 2019 and ending in March 2021 (TLTRO-III). At the date of this report going to press, 
the ECB has announced that these operations will have a maturity of two years, will be 
conducted at a variable rate indexed to the interest rate on the main refinancing operations 
(currently 0%), and that further details on these operations will be communicated in due course.
Activity on the euro area unsecured interbank money markets remains very low. 
The EONIA trading volume is very low and has continued to decline in recent months 
(see Chart 2.11.C). The fall in the volumes of activity of the Spanish and European interbank 
markets are explained by: i) the conditions of surplus liquidity in the system, which means 
that banks do not need have recourse to interbank market funds since their liquidity 
requirements are already covered; ii) the new regulatory framework, which favours secured 
lending transactions7 and iii) banks’ aversion to counterparty risk, which emerged during 
the financial crisis and which has led to structural changes with banks opting for transactions 
backed by collateral instead of unsecured ones. 
Most of the activity in unsecured money markets is conducted by institutions that do 
not have access to the ECB’s deposit facility, which helps to explain the differences 
between the EONIA and €STR interest rates. These institutions include European non-
bank financial corporations (asset management companies, pension funds, insurance 
companies) and non-EU resident banks. These institutions have received abundant liquidity 
as holders of substantial asset volumes now absorbed by the ECB in the framework of its 
“asset purchase programme”. The surplus liquidity is deposited in European banks which, 
in turn, place it in the deposit facility. The deposits of banks that do not have access to the 
deposit facility in European banks are made at lower rate than that of the deposit facility 
itself, which explains why the €STR rate, also applied to this type of transactions, is below 
the deposit facility rate. In contrast, the EONIA, only applied to transactions between EU 
6 Specifically, until the end of the reserve maintenance period starting in March 2021.
7 Specifically, solvency regulations reduce capital requirements for collateralised exposures.
SOURCE: EBA.
a The data refer to a sample of 149 institutions, and the LCR is calculated as the weighted average of the ratios of each country’s institutions.
b Greek banks monetised their liquid assets to cover their neck liquidity needs. That placed the LCR below 100% in the period of tension that has prevailed to date, 
in accordance with the provisions of Art. 4 (3) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61 of 10 October 2014.
c EBA data include Iceland.
The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) at the European level stood at 152% as at December 2018, far above the required minimum threshold of 100%. The 
European countries as a whole posted a ratio of over 100%, with the exception of Greece.
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banks, is similar to the deposit facility rate, which acts as a floor given the liquidity surplus 
(see Chart 2.11.D and Box 2.1 on the new benchmark indices in Europe).
Activity in secured markets (repos), which represents the bulk of the total trading 
volume in European money markets, has increased in the last two years. Institutions 
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Activity on the euro area unsecured interbank money markets remains very low, while the funding provided by the Eurosystem has been very high in 
recent years. Spanish institutions reduced their aggregate issuance activity in 2018, compared with the previous year.
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Dealogic, Eikon, Thomson Reuters and Banco de España.
a Includes covered bonds, senior debt, subordinated debt eligible as tier 2 capital and debt eligible as additional tier 1 capital. Retained issues are not included.
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BOX 2.1 THE REFORM OF BENCHMARK RATES: FROM EONIA TO €STR
Benchmark rates are essential for determining the price of 
numerous financial instruments and financial contracts. Of these 
benchmarks, EONIA is particularly significant in derivatives 
contracts and the overnight indexed swap (OIS)1 market as well as 
for the transmission of monetary policy. 
EONIA is calculated as a weighted average rate of all overnight 
unsecured lending transactions in the interbank market reported 
voluntarily by 28 panel banks. The decrease in activity on its 
underlying markets and the reduction in the number of banks 
participating in the panels have affected adversely the integrity and 
robustness of this index. In fact, it does not meet the requirements of 
the new European Benchmarks Regulation2 (BMR) and, consequently, 
needs to be reformed by 1 January 2020, the deadline set for indices 
used as benchmarks to comply with this Regulation. 
EMMI,3 the administrator of EONIA, initially sought to align this 
index with the BMR requirements. However, in 2017 it announced 
that it would not continue the reform of EONIA and undertook to 
provide this critical benchmark4 until the end of the BMR transition 
period. It stated that it could not guarantee that EONIA would 
comply with the BMR, in which case, it would not be able to use it 
as a benchmark as from 2020. Accordingly, a proposal was made 
to EMMI to modify the methodology used to calculate EONIA to 
facilitate the transition to the new risk-free rate. 
Central banks are developing risk-free overnight rates which may 
complement private-sector indices, given their key role for 
monetary policy transmission. Against this background, the ECB is 
the administrator of an index called €STR, which it has developed. 
€STR is a representative benchmark of the euro area reflecting the 
borrowing costs for euro area banks of raising funds in the wholesale 
market on overnight deposits on an arm’s length basis. The rate will 
be published daily based on individual deposit transactions in the 
European money market which 50 agents must report to the ECB 
within the arrangements of the money market statistical reporting 
(MMSR) regulation.5 The underlying market is that of banks’ deposits 
from financial institutions and not only those from other banks. €STR 
and EONIA are based on unsecured overnight transactions, but 
there are important economic differences between them since 
EONIA includes the rate at which banks lend funds to each other on 
the interbank market whereas €STR includes the rate banks pay for 
deposits from other counterparties which are not necessarily banks. 
These differences explain the spread existing between the two rates. 
€STR rates are between 7 bp and 9 bp lower than EONIA rates, as 
can be seen in Chart 2.11.D. 
In September 2018 the working group on euro risk-free rates6 
recommended that €STR be used as the new euro area risk-free rate to 
replace EONIA. Nevertheless, EONIA will continue to exist and may be 
used in contracts in force during a limited period of time to facilitate a 
smooth transition to €STR. On 14 March 2019 the ECB announced that 
it will begin to publish €STR on 2 October 2019, three months before the 
deadline for replacing EONIA, to reflect the previous day’s operations. 
With the €STR identified as the recommended benchmark, it is 
important that banks work to ensure an orderly transition from 
EONIA to €STR and to resolve the risks and problems which may 
arise with the contracts and instruments currently using EONIA as a 
benchmark (legacy assets). Accordingly, the working group 
recommended that EMMI, as its administrator, modify the current 
methodology for calculating EONIA to facilitate the transition to the 
new risk-free rate to give market participants sufficient time to 
transition to €STR.7 Thus, for a limited period of time until end-2021, 
EONIA will be calculated by applying a fixed spread to €STR,8 to be 
published by the ECB instead of being based on the data provided 
by a panel of credit institutions. 
The ECB also stated on 14 March that it supports private-sector 
efforts for a successful transition from EONIA and will provide the 
calculation of the spread between EONIA and €STR on a specific 
date before publication of €STR begins. Thus, the EMMI is 
projected to begin publishing EONIA under the recalibrated 
methodology based on €STR on 2 October at the same time as the 
ECB publishes €STR. Parallel publication is expected to last until 
end-2021 and thereafter only €STR will be published. 
Finally, the working group also recommended that market 
participants gradually replace EONIA by €STR and that €STR be 
used in all new products and contracts signed as from January 2020.
1  It is estimated that the outstanding volume of unsecured money market 
instruments using EONIA as a reference rate stood at around €450 trillion 
at end-2017. Use of the OIS market is estimated to exceed €5.2 trillion.
2  Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 8 June 2016 on indices used as benchmarks. The Regulation, 
implemented due to cases of benchmark manipulation, seeks to improve 
the method for calculating benchmarks. It does so by requiring that the 
calculation be based on real transactions and that governance and 
controls in the provision of benchmarks be strengthened, thus avoiding 
conflicts of interest.
3  The European Money Market Institute (EMMI) is a private institution 
responsible for administering EONIA. It is a non-for-profit association 
under Belgian law founded in 1999. Its members are national banking 
associations in EU Member States.
4  EONIA was designated as a critical benchmark in June 2017. EURIBOR 
and LIBOR are also critical benchmarks which were designated in 
August 2016 and December 2017, respectively.
5  Regulation (EU) No 1333/2014 of the European Central Bank of 26 
November 2014 concerning statistics on the money markets 
(ECB/2014/48). The main purpose of collecting such statistics is to 
provide the ECB with comprehensive, detailed and harmonised statistical 
information on the money markets in the euro area which provide 
information on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy decisions.
6  It is an industry-led group established in 2018 by the ECB, the Belgian 
Financial Services and Markets Authority (FSMA), the European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Commission and 
comprises 21 large European banks, including BBVA and Santander, and 
five industry associations.
7  EMMI was also requested to engage with the relevant authorities to 
ensure that EONIA, revised in accordance with the new methodology, 
complies with the BMR.
8  On 14 March 2019 the working group made a recommendation to EMMI 
for a specific formula to calculate this spread between €STR and EONIA 
which should be based on public data.
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are using these markets to manage their collateral needs, rather than to cover their cash 
flow or liquidity needs, as occurred in the past. Institutions have a greater need for high-
quality liquid assets (HQLA), in particular, sovereign bonds, against a background of 
uncertainty as to their availability, owing to a combination of factors. In this context, 
sovereign bonds with investment-grade rating are the type of asset most used in the repo 
market, most of them cleared by central counterparties (CCPs).
With regard to longer-term funding, Spanish banks reduced their aggregate issuance 
activity in 2018 compared with the previous year. By type of debt instrument issued, 
there was a decrease in the amount of issues of senior and subordinated debt, both that 
eligible as additional Tier 1 capital and that eligible as Tier 2 capital. In contrast, the amount 
of covered bonds issued in 2018 was higher than in the previous year (see Chart 2.11.E), 
although it should be noted that 2017 had seen a significant decrease compared with the 
amounts issued in 2015 and 2016, when issues by Spanish banks were concentrated in 
these secured debt instruments.
However, the need to continue issuing bonds in the near future will be boosted, 
owing to the paradigm change in the resolution of banks, which has led to the 
establishment of minimum requirements for own funds and other eligible liabilities. 
The Single Resolution Board (SRB) has set binding targets for significant European 
institutions in relation to the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities 
(MREL). To meet the MREL targets, institutions need to issue different debt instruments 
with different degrees of subordination and associated costs that are higher than those 
of senior debt or secured instruments such as covered bonds. The subordinated debt 
instruments that are eligible as MREL are complex products that should not be 
distributed among retail investors, but should be reserved for wholesale investors with 
the ability to analyse the risk involved and profitability offered by the product. It should 
be borne in mind that, in the event of the bank’s resolution, these instruments may 
ultimately absorb losses totally or partially, with the subsequent impact on the financial 
position of the holder. In such circumstances, the presence of retailers may become a 
hindrance to the resolvability of banks. The issuance of eligible liabilities for MREL 
purposes is far more of a challenge for small and medium-sized banks, with less issuing 
experience and a retail-oriented funding model.
The seniority of the claim relating to different debt instruments and the yield which 
banks must offer to attract this type of funding on the markets are inversely related. 
Specifically, an analysis of the issues of four debt instruments (covered bonds, senior debt, 
subordinated debt eligible as Tier 2 capital and subordinated debt eligible as additional Tier 1 
capital, listed by seniority) by banks in the five main European countries (Spain, France, 
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom) in the last three years (from 2016 to 2018) shows 
that the cost of covered bond and senior debt issues differs substantially from that of 
subordinated debt issues (see Chart 2.12.A).8 Regarding subordinated debt, the cost of 
debt eligible as additional Tier 1 capital is appreciably higher than that of subordinated debt 
eligible as Tier 2 capital. 
Recent years have seen a decrease in the cost of subordinated debt and a slight 
increase in that of European covered bonds and senior debt. A comparison of issuance 
costs in the main European countries in the last three years (see Chart 2.12.B) reveals 
8  The dispersion in the cost of senior debt is higher, since it is by far the most frequently issued type of debt, and 
therefore includes banks with widely varying types of business, size and financial position. In part, this dispersion 
may respond to the fact that non-preferred senior debt cannot be separated from other debt.
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no major differences between countries and, in general, the average yields offered for each 
type of instrument fall within similar bands. However, some decline in the trend can be 
observed in the yields offered for subordinated debt and a slightly rising trend for European 
covered bonds and senior debt (see Chart 2.12.C). Consequently, the differential in the cost 
of subordinated debt and that of senior debt and covered bonds has narrowed in the last 
three years (by around 1.5 pp for subordinated debt eligible as additional Tier 1 capital and 
by 1 pp for debt eligible as Tier 2 capital).
The higher the level of the CET1 ratio, the lower the cost of issuance, with this effect 
increasing the closer the debt instrument is to a capital instrument. An empirical 
analysis conducted using the data on the issuance of debt instruments by European banks 
SOURCES: Dealogic and SNL.
a The chart shows the maximum cost, the minimum cost, the range between the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile, and the weighted (by the amount of the 
issues) average of the cost for Spanish, Italian, French, German and British banks from 2016 to 2018 of issues of covered bonds, senior debt, subordinated debt 
eligible as tier 2 capital and debt eligible as additional tier 1 capital. The minimum cost of issues of covered bonds and senior debt is below zero since in some 
cases the coupon on the issue is index-linked (e.g. to the three-month EURIBOR), plus a spread, and the value of the index at the time of issuance is less than 
the spread applied.
b For each type of instrument, the chart shows the coefficient relating to the CET1 ratio in a multivariate regression with the issuance cost as a dependent variable, 
and other characteristics of the issue (maturity, volume), of the issuer (total assets, solvency, nationality), and market conditions (index of the European banking 
sector, interest rate on government debt of the country of residence of the issuer with the maturity closest to that of the issue) as explanatory variables. For 
example, the coefficient of -0.3 for Tier 1 indicates that a 1 pp increase in the CET1 ratio of an issuing bank is associated, all things being equal, with a -0.3 pp 
reduction in the issuance costs of this instrument. The estimation is made on issues by banks from Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom for 
the 2016-2018 period.
There is a clear relationship between the cost of issues and the seniority of the claim relating to debt instruments: the closer the debt is to the institution’s 
capital, the greater its cost. Further, the closer the debt instrument is in its characteristics to a capital instrument, the greater the reduction in the costs 
associated with a higher CET1 ratio of the issuer.
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in 2016-2018,9 to attempt to identify the determinants of the cost of the different debt 
instruments, revealed that the level of the CET1 ratio (the highest-quality capital) has a 
statistically significant negative effect on the cost of issuing senior and subordinated debt, 
both that eligible as Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. Conversely, the CET1 ratio of the issuer does 
not significantly affect covered bonds, a relatively more homogeneous product secured by 
the mortgage portfolio (see Chart 2.12.D).10 Lastly, the analysis of subordinated debt issues 
shows that the size of banks is also significant, and that those with a higher level of assets 
have lower issuance costs.
The aforementioned inverse relationship between the CET1 ratio and issuance costs 
is highly significant for Spanish banks. This is because they will have to issue a significant 
amount of subordinated debt instruments in the coming years (additional Tier 1, non-
preferred senior debt) to meet the MREL requirements imposed on them. The higher their 
CET1 ratio, the lower the expected cost of the new issues.
No vulnerabilities or significant changes have been identified as regards retail funding, 
whose volume and composition remained relatively stable, with 0.7% year-on-year growth 
in deposits at consolidated level.
Profitability
In 2018 the Spanish banking sector recorded consolidated profit attributable to the 
parent of €19,438 million, 24.8% higher than in 2017. This increase in consolidated profit 
represented growth of 11 bp in the return on assets (ROA), from 0.44% in 2017 to 0.55% in 
2018 (see Annex 2). The return on equity (ROE) rose from 6% at December 2017 to 7.2% at 
December 2018, which, in principle, improves the resilience of Spanish banks against future 
shocks. The recovery of profitability contributes to bringing the ROE closer to the levels of 
cost of equity (COE) estimated for the banking sector, although it is still below the average 
COE values seen after the economic crisis of 2008.
At consolidated level, both net interest income and net fees and commissions increased 
compared with the previous year, while gains on financial assets and liabilities 
decreased. Net interest income increased slightly (1%, see Annex 2) year-on-year in the past 
year, since interest expenses decreased by more than interest revenue (-3.8% and -0.7%, 
respectively). The year-on-year increase in net fees and commissions was higher (3.6%), 
although its lower amount in relation to net interest income results in a growth lower than that 
of net interest income relative to average total assets (ATA) (see Chart 2.13.A). As has been 
the case over the last few years, gains on financial assets and liabilities fell once again (by 
more than 25%). Thus, gross income declined slightly, by 0.7%, in 2018. 
In the current low interest rate environment, banks have focused somewhat more on 
the provision of banking services, with the result that fees and commissions increased. 
9   Multivariate regressions were conducted, with the cost of the issue as a dependent variable, and other 
characteristics relating to the issue (maturity and volume), the issuer (total assets, solvency and nationality), and 
market conditions (European banking sector index and interest rate on government debt of the country of 
residence of the issuer with the maturity closest to that of the issue), as explanatory variables. The robustness 
of the results were analysed by adding other issuer characteristics such as the credit rating, which is more 
favourable in the case of higher solvency levels and larger issuers. With these specifications, the lower issuance 
cost associated with a higher level of the CET1 ratio is maintained, either as a direct effect or as a result of an 
upgraded credit rating.
10  These results are based on all issues by banks in the main European countries, most of which were carried 
out by large banks. These results are not verifiable in the case of smaller banks, given the very limited 
number of issues.
2.1.2  PROFITABILITY  
AND SOLVENCY
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This trend in recent years (downward in net interest income and upward in net fees and 
commissions) also arose in the activity of credit institutions in Spain, although net interest 
income has already remained stable in the past year (see Chart 2.14.A). Net fees and 
commissions continued to grow in 2018, almost 4% year-on-year, resulting in an almost 
0.4 pp increase in its weight in gross income (see Chart 2.14.B).
In any event, the main determinant of the improvement in profit for the Spanish 
banking sector in 2018 was the decrease in impairment losses. In keeping with the 
pattern of recent years, impairment losses declined in 2018 (see Chart 2.13.B). The decline 
was substantial, over 16%, and amounted to close to €3 billion. In a setting of stagnant 
margins, it is the main driver of the improvement in profit for Spanish institutions in 2018. 
Additionally, the positive change in the contribution of extraordinary operations also 
boosted profitability.
The cost-to-income ratio of Spanish banks has improved since 2016 owing to the 
increase in gross income and the containment of expenses, whose structure has 
been relatively stable for Spanish banks since 2015. The slight decline in the level of 
operating expenses in 2016 and the unfavourable changes in gross income led to a 
worsening of the aggregate cost-to-income ratio, which rose from 52.7% in 
2015 to 55.7% in 2016. From that year, the containment of expenses and the 
improvement in gross income have allowed the ratio level to recover up to 53.3% in 
2018 (see Chart 2.15.A). A breakdown of administrative expenses linked to the activity 
of Spanish banks in 2015 and 2018 shows some stability, with predominance of staff 
costs (53%), followed by IT and communications (11.6%), outsourced services and 
technical reports (8.6%) and depreciation (8.2%). The last three items increase their 
weight in comparison with the structure in 2015, when they accounted for 10.1%, 7.7% 
and 7.2%, respectively of total expense (see Chart 2.15.B). This change reflects the 
digitalisation process and the increased technological component in the activity of 
these institutions.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The red (green) colour of the bars indicates a negative (positive) contribution of the corresponding item to the change in consolidated profit in December 2018 with 
respect to December 2017.
Both net interest income and net commissions rose on the previous year, while gains and losses on financial assets and liabilities fell. The main 
determinant of the improvement in income for the Spanish banking sector is the reduction in impairment losses, which fell by over 16% in 2018.
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In terms of profitability and efficiency, Spanish institutions stand above the European 
average. Based on European Banking Authority (EBA) data as at December 2018,11 the 
Spanish banking sector is one of the highest ranking in profitability in comparison with 
the main European countries (see Chart 2.16.A). Similarly, the cost-to-income ratio, i.e. the 
ratio of operating expenses to gross income, of Spanish institutions is one of the lowest 
(best) in Europe (see Chart 2.16.B).
11 See http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/risk-dashboard
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FINANCIAL REVENUE
SOURCE: Banco de España.
The consolidated cost-to-income ratio has trended favourably since 2016, owing both to higher net operating income and to the reduction in 
administrative expenses and depreciation charges. At the individual level, administrative expenses as at December 2018 where concentrated chiefly 
in personnel costs, IT and communication, outsourced administrative services and technical reports, and depreciation, with the cost structure relatively 
stable compared with 2015.
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Solvency
The ratio which measures the highest quality capital, Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) 
capital, stood at 12.2% in December 2018, decreasing by 43 bp in the past year, 
largely owing to lower transitional adjustments (see Chart 2.17.A). CET1 capital 
decreased by around 5% in the past year, largely owing to the fall in transitional 
adjustments12 which in previous years reduced the deductions of certain CET1 items 
(goodwill, deferred tax assets, etc.) and which have been applied gradually up to the full 
implementation of Basel III. Therefore, Spanish banks did not offset with increases in capital 
or reserves the erosion of CET1 capital which the process of adjustment to the new 
regulations entails. Additionally, risk weighted assets (RWAs) also decreased in the past 
year, although to a lesser extent than CET1 capital (by 2%) (see Chart 2.17.B).
As set forth in the previous FSR, in recent years the CET1 solvency ratio has increased 
only moderately. In particular, the CET1 capital ratio only increased by 42 bp in the period 
12  Transitional adjustments generally defer over time the deductions from own funds set out in Directive 2013/36/
EU of 26 June 2013 (CRD IV) and in Regulation (EU) 575/2013 of 26 June 2013 (CRR), which implement Basel 
III in Europe such that the reduction of CET1 is spread over more years. Broadly speaking, the transitional 
adjustment was 80% in 2014, 60% in 2015, 40% in 2016, 20% in 2017, and disappears in 2018.
SOURCE: EBA.
a Data not published by the EBA.
b The cost-to-income ratio is defined as the ratio of operating expenses to gross income.
c EBA data include Iceland.
In terms of return on assets, Spanish institutions stand above the European average and that of the main European countries. Along these lines, the 
Spanish banking sector’s cost-to-income ratio is among the lowest (best) in Europe.
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2014-2018, despite the decrease in the denominator and the recovery of bank profits during 
the period, coinciding with the Spanish economy’s more favourable performance. 
By contrast, the regulatory change prompted an increase in the Tier 1 capital and total 
capital ratios in the past year (to 13.5% and 15.4%, respectively), and the CET1 Fully 
Loaded capital ratio also increased by 0.1 pp, to 11.8%. The Tier 1 capital ratio increased 
by 30 bp in the past year, largely reflecting the reduction of transitional adjustments discussed 
above (since deductions are now applied directly to CET1 and not to additional Tier 1 capital, 
as was the case while transitional adjustments were in force). The total capital ratio rose 
slightly (by 6 bp) in the same period. The CET1 Fully Loaded capital ratio,13 which is calculated 
at each date by applying the full implementation of the solvency regulation without applying 
transitional adjustments, improved by 0.1 pp as compared with the value in 2017.
The distribution of the change in 2018 of the CET1 ratio shows some concentration 
in negative values, indicating that the decrease in the solvency ratio relates to a set 
of institutions representing a high volume of RWAs in the sector. Chart 2.18.A shows 
the distribution, by volume of RWAs, of the change in the CET1 ratio between December 
2017 and December 2018. It can be seen that most of the curve corresponds with 
negative values of the rate of change. Chart 2.18.B shows how most banks record 
increases in the CET1 level, whereas the number of banks increasing or decreasing their 
RWAs is relatively balanced. This analysis indicates that, in some cases, the increase is 
greater in RWAs than in CET1, resulting in a reduction of the ratio, and that, in general, 
small firms increase their ratio, but they are not sufficiently significant to increase the 
CET1 ratio at aggregate level. 
At aggregate level, equity instruments and reserves are the main components of CET1 
capital as at December 2018, while transitional adjustments represent a very small 
13  The CET1 Fully Loaded (FL) capital ratio between 2017 and 2018 was affected by the entry into force of the new 
IFRS 9 accounting regulations, applicable to the ratio in 2018 but not in 2017, when the standard was not even 
partially in force. In any event, in order to fully compare FL ratios it would be necessary to discount from the 
2017 ratio the impact of the entry into force of IFRS 9.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
The CET1 ratio declined by 43 bp to 12.2% in December 2018, while the Tier 1 capital and total capital ratios increased last year. Risk-weighted assets 
declined by 2% last year.
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proportion owing to the degree of implementation of Basel III. Chart 2.19.A details the 
composition of the CET1 ratio in terms of risk-weighted assets. Equity instruments and 
reserves represent 9 pp and 6 pp, respectively, of the CET1 ratio. Minority interests represent 
1 pp of the ratio and transitional adjustments have reduced their weight to below 0.5 pp of 
the ratio. As for deductions from CET1, the most significant from a quantitative viewpoint are 
those arising from goodwill and other intangible assets (3.2 pp of the ratio), followed 
by those derived from deferred tax assets (1.2 pp of the ratio).
The performance of CET1 capital in the past four years differs from that of dividends 
(approximately €25 billion in total volume) distributed by Spanish banks in that period 
(1.8 pp relative to the volume of RWAs at December 2018). Chart 2.19.B shows how the 
distribution of dividends in the period 2015-2018 has remained within a range of between 
0.6 pp and 0.3 pp relative to RWAs in 2018. With a pay-out ratio of around 50% of net profit 
for the sector as a whole, the organic generation of capital does not appear to be sufficient 
for banks to be able to respond swiftly to an increase in the demand for credit or to address 
the need to absorb losses should any of the risks mentioned in this FSR materialise, without 
significant further erosion of their CET1 ratio.
In comparative terms, the CET1 ratio of Spanish banks at December 2018 was ranked 
last among the main European countries, while in terms of the leverage ratio their 
position is more favourable. Chart 2.20 shows the European comparison of two solvency 
measures, the CET1 ratio (Chart 2.20.A) and the leverage ratio (Chart 2.20.B) based on data 
published by the European Banking Authority in December 2018.14 As for the highest-
quality capital ratio, Spain stands last in the European context. For its part, the leverage 
ratio of Spanish banks stood at 5.4%, higher than the European average (5.3%) and the 
main European countries.
14 See http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/risk-dashboard
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The chart shows the density function (or the frequency distribution) of the change in the CET1 ratio from December 2017 to December 2018 for Spanish deposit 
institutions, weighted by the risk-weighted assets of each bank in 2017. This density function is proxied by a kernel estimator, which enables a nonparametric 
estimate of the density function, providing a continuous and smoothed graphical representation of this function. The vertical line represents the median (unweighted) 
of the rate of change of the CET1 ratio from December 2017 to December 2018.
b The points above the bisecting line show growths (declines) in the volume of CET1 in 2018 higher (lower) than the growth (decline) in the volume of RWAs; 
accordingly, they would correspond to increases in the CET1 ratio in 2018. The opposite occurs for the points below the bisecting line.
In terms of risk-weighted assets, there were more reductions than increases in the CET1 ratio from December 2017 to December 2018. In terms of 
banks, more increased their CET1 ratio in 2018 than reduced it.
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-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
A  DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHANGE IN THE CET1 RATIO (a)
Median (unweighted)
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
B  RATE OF CHANGE IN THE CET1 RATIO AND IN RWAs IN 2018 (b)
RWAs rate of change (%)
C
E
T1
 ra
te
 o
f c
ha
ng
e 
(%
)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 63 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, SPRING 2019
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Capital instruments and reserves are the main components of CET1 and jointly represent over 90% of its eligible elements. In recent years, dividends have 
accounted for a percentage of between 0.2% and 0.6% of risk-weighted assets.
COMPOSITION OF THE CET1 RATIO AND DIVIDENDS AS A PERCENTAGE OF RWAs CHART 2.19
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
2015 2016 2017 2018
B  DIVIDENDS AS A % OF RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS IN 2018
%
0
4
8
12
16
20
Capital Reserves Minority
interests
Transi-
tional
adjust-
ments
Goodwill
and
other
intangibles
Deferred
tax
assets and
other
deductions
CET1
A  COMPOSITION OF THE CET1 RATIO RELATIVE TO RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS
%
SOURCE: EBA.
a EBA data include Iceland.
In terms of the CET1 ratio, Spanish banks stand last among the main European countries; but in terms of the leverage ratio their position is more 
favourable and their ratio exceeds the European average.
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The Banco de España has been conducting regularly since 2013 tests of the Spanish 
banking system’s resilience using an analysis framework known as FLESB (Forward 
Looking Exercise on Spanish Banks). The results of the latest FLESB exercise for the 
2018-2020 horizon, in which the same macroeconomic scenarios were applied as those 
designed for the European stress tests exercise for 2018 coordinated by the EBA,15 were 
published in the November 2018 FSR. Based on this exercise, a sensitivity analysis is 
conducted which aims to study the impact on the Spanish banking sector’s solvency of 
shocks to certain macroeconomic variables in comparison with baseline scenario values. 
The shocks considered relate to extreme adverse values in the individual series of the 
macroeconomic variables.
Sensitivity scenarios
The baseline scenario for the FLESB and EBA exercises included the most likely 
changes in the economic environment for Spain over the three years of the exercise 
from 2018 to 2020, based on the projections available in early 2018. Shocks to different 
macroeconomic variables were applied to this scenario which are either related to 
the macrofinancial risks identified in this FSR or have been identified as significant for 
assessing solvency in previous FLESB exercises. The sensitivity analysis is conducted to 
study the impact which each of these variables could have on bank solvency in the event 
that an extreme adverse shock to it were to materialise in accordance with its historical 
distribution. Measurement of a greater impact does not necessarily imply that the shock will 
be more likely to materialise. In particular, four sets of shocks were studied: i) less global 
buoyancy with an impact on international trade; ii) increased uncertainty in Spain with 
downward adjustments in household consumption and in business investment, 
iii) downward adjustments in equity market prices, and iv) in house prices. For each of these 
stressed cases, shocks are applied to the relevant variables16 that relate to historical bouts 
of high and very high stress (5th and 1st percentiles, respectively, of their distributions) and 
the endogenous response to the rest of Spanish macroeconomic variables is calculated 
on the basis of the Banco de España’s macroeconometric models. Thus, a complete macro 
scenario is obtained consistent with the shock introduced. Since four sets of shocks and 
two levels of severity are considered, there are eight different simulation scenarios. 
The effect of these shocks to GDP and to house prices in Spain is significant. 
Chart 2.21 shows the cumulative impact over the three years of the exercise of the change 
in GDP and house prices under simulated scenarios relative to the baseline scenario. Only 
the episodes of higher stress for each of the variables are shown (1st percentile). In the 
baseline scenario, GDP grows steadily at an annual rate of more than 2%, reaching 
cumulative growth of up to 6.7%. Chart 2.21.A shows that the impact on cumulative growth 
of GDP over the three years of the exercise ranges from 0.5 pp under the scenario of shock 
to equity prices, to 5.7 pp under the scenario of shock to international trade. House prices 
maintain annual growth of around 5% under the baseline scenario, with cumulative growth 
of 15.5%. The impact on cumulative growth ranges between only 0.7 pp under the scenario of 
shock to equities and 29.3 pp under the scenario where an exogenous shock is directly 
applied to the house price path (see Chart 2.21.B).
15  The scenarios for the EBA exercise are publicly available via the following link: https://eba.europa.eu/
documents/10180/2106649/Adverse+macroeconomic+scenario+for+the+EBA+2018+Stress+Test.pdf
16  Specifically, in the scenarios of stressed global markets a shock to world trade affecting Spanish exports is 
introduced, causing a direct impact on GDP and an indirect one through the model’s endogenous response. 
The scenarios of activity apply simultaneous shocks to consumption and investment, while in the scenarios 
stressing the stock exchange and the real estate market shocks are applied to price growth.
2.1.3  ANALYSIS OF SENSITIVITY 
OF SOLVENCY  
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To conduct this analysis the FLESB framework methodology was used in order to 
transfer the changes in the national macroeconomic scenario to the results of the 
banking business in Spain and to the level of solvency of the banking groups. To 
estimate the results on solvency, the data from 57 banks relating to December 2017 are 
used as a starting point (12 under the SSM’s direct supervision and 45 less significant 
institutions).17 Chart 2.22 includes the results, by type of institution, in terms of the difference 
between the average CET1 Fully Loaded capital ratio at the end of the horizon for the 
baseline scenario and for each of the adverse scenarios. The scenario associated with a 
greater impact on the CET1 ratio relates to the extreme shock to house prices. This is 
largely due to the loss in value experienced by real estate collateral, which entails a higher 
increase in the loss in the event of non-performance, and a greater loss associated with the 
settlement of foreclosed assets. These losses are much lower in the case of scenarios with 
a greater impact on activity.
The average CET1 ratio at the end of the analysis time horizon for all the institutions 
would be 2.3 pp lower under the highest-impact adverse scenario (extreme shock to 
house prices) than under the baseline scenario. Under this highest-impact scenario 
(1st percentile), the CET1 ratio would post an aggregate decrease relative to the baseline 
scenario of 1.9 pp in the case of SIs with significant international activity, of 3.5 pp for other 
SIs and of 1.5 pp in the case of LSIs. The difference in impact between SIs and LSIs arises 
from the different portfolios and business characteristics of the two types of institutions. In 
turn, SIs with international activity are more resilient, since profits obtained by foreign 
subsidiaries absorb a portion of the losses arising from the downturn in national economic 
activity incorporated into the analysis. The lower impact relates to the scenario of shock 
17  The capital of institutions with international activity could also deteriorate owing to the impact of a change in 
the macroeconomic scenario on their subsidiaries’ activities. Based on the results of the November 2018 
FLESB exercise, the impact attributable to the activity of subsidiaries on the CET1 ratio under a full adverse 
scenario would be 0.8 pp in aggregate terms. This measure may be used as a ceiling, since the set of shocks 
under the sensitivity scenarios is more restricted than under the full adverse scenario. This possible further 
erosion is more significant for scenarios involving a downturn in global markets, which are more likely to have 
international ramifications.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Both for cumulative GDP growth and house prices, what is shown as the impact of the sensitivity scenarios on the level reached in the baseline scenario within 
the exercise’s horizon (2018-2020). For example, the impact of -1.45 pp associated with the house price shock in panel A indicates that the cumulative growth 
of GDP for 2018-2020 under this scenario is 1.45 pp lower than under the baseline scenario. The baseline scenario coincides with that designed for the stress 
test coordinated by the EBA at the European level, and the sensitivity scenarios include solely those associated with the 1st percentile of the distribution of the 
four sets of shocks under study.
The shock to global markets, impacting Spanish exports, is what exerts a maximum effect on GDP, followed by the shock to consumption and domestic 
investment. The scenario with a direct shock to the growth of house prices has a significantly greater impact on this variable than the indirect impacts 
associated with the other scenarios.
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to equity prices,18 owing to its moderate effect on losses from credit portfolios and 
foreclosed properties.
The analysis discloses a significant impact of the hypothetical downturn in the 
Spanish economy on changes in the solvency of institutions, although the system has 
an appropriate degree of aggregate solvency under all the scenarios considered. As 
mentioned previously, it should be borne in mind that each of the sensitivity scenarios 
represents the individual materialisation of each of the risks. However, some of these risks 
are interrelated and, therefore, may materialise together. This would lead to a greater impact 
on the solvency of institutions, as occurred, for example in the FLESB exercise published in 
the November 2018 FSR, which used a full macro scenario.19 Also, the most critical adverse 
scenarios evaluated in this exercise are concentrated in shocks to national economic 
activity and house prices. These are only part of the broader set of macrofinancial risks that 
are significant for the Spanish financial system and which are analysed in Chapter 1.
The correct interpretation of results requires taking into account that sensitivity to 
macroeconomic factors of the financial system may change over time and the 
importance of each factor should be assessed within the risk identification framework 
of this FSR as a whole. Changes in bank balance sheets, with developments such as the 
decline in real estate exposures or the change in international positions over the course of 
2018, imply that sensitivities to macroeconomic factors may change over time, requiring 
ongoing monitoring of these effects. The most significant risks identified in the introduction 
and Chapter 1 of this FSR are the risks to activity, particularly owing to the downturn 
18  A prudent adjustment is common to the scenario of shock to equities and the rest of the adverse scenarios, in 
connection with historical distributions, of different gross income items (e.g. gains or losses on financial 
transactions, which explain a substantial fraction of the impact of this scenario), with only a very moderate 
effect on macroeconomic variables and credit losses.
19  In the full macro scenario shocks are introduced not only to individual variables, but to a broad set of variables, 
producing more adverse final GDP paths than those considered in this exercise. This does not mean that in the 
full scenario shocks are calibrated on the 1st percentile of the individual distribution of each variable, which 
would produce a fairly implausible combined effect based on historical experience.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The results are presented in terms of the difference in the CET1 capital ratio (FL) at the end of the analysis horizon in each of the adverse scenarios compared 
with the level attained under the baseline scenario (coinciding with that designed for the stress test coordinated at the European level by the EBA). Solely the 
scenarios associated with the 1st percentile of the distribution of these four sets of shocks are included. The results are shown both for the total and for each 
type of institution: International SI (significant institutions under the SSM supervision with significant international activity), Other SI (other significant institutions 
under SSM supervision) and LSI (less significant institutions under direct national supervision).
The average CET1 ratio shows a maximum sensitivity to the introduction of an adverse extreme shock to house prices, both for the total and for each of 
the relevant sub-groups. The shocks to activity, and especially that associated with the downturn on global markets, also have a significant impact on 
solvency. The group of institutions most sensitive to the deterioration in macroeconomic conditions is that of significant institutions without major 
international activity.
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in global trade, more than risk factors relating to house prices, for which there is currently 
no evidence of overvaluation.
In most developed economies the financial system is comprised of a complex network 
of institutions with different corporate structures and regulatory regimes which in 
certain cases carry out similar activities. In performing their main functions, the 
institutions in the financial system establish relationships with each other and also with non-
financial corporations, households and the public sector. Banks tend to play a central role 
in the financial system, but other agents also perform key activities and, in some cases, 
offer funding to the rest of economic agents in a manner similar to banks.
Non-bank financing is an alternative to bank financing which encourages competition 
and increases the sources of funds but it may also entail certain risks. Alternative 
sources of financing allow economic agents greater flexibility when obtaining funds for 
investment or consumption and may contribute to greater diversification of the risks taken 
by the financial system. However, the global increase in the size of the non-banking sector 
in recent years and its involvement in activities inherent to the banking sector (liquidity or 
maturity transformation, credit risk transfer or leverage) may also become a source of risk, 
directly or as a result of its interconnections with the banking sector.
In recent years interconnections within the financial system have become increasingly 
prominent on the agendas of national and international regulatory and supervisory 
bodies. This is because of their importance in the latest financial crisis, where it became 
obvious that at times of stress, these interconnections may mean that shocks, which initially 
seem institution or sector-specific, are passed on to other sectors. The analyses conducted 
in recent years have focused on studying non-bank financial institutions which extend 
financing to financial and non-financial sectors of the economy. 
The information in the Spanish Financial Accounts allows the volume of financial 
assets of the various banking and non-banking segments of the financial system to 
be measured. On Financial Accounts data (non-consolidated and of institutions domiciled 
in Spain) a broad range of agents that make up the financial sector can be identified and 
which, based on the nature of their activities may be key, to some degree, to the functioning 
of the system. The use of Financial Accounts data (non-consolidated and of institutions 
domiciled in Spain) makes it possible to identify a broad range of agents that make up the 
financial sector and that, depending on the nature of their activities, differ in their degree of 
centrality in the functioning of the system. For the purposes of the analysis in this section, 
the financial system is split into four categories: i) deposit-taking institutions (or banks), 
ii) other financial entities (specialised lending institutions, investment funds, other financial 
intermediaries and other sectors),20 iii) insurance companies, and iv) pension funds.
The banking sector remains the main component of the financial system, despite the 
decline in its financial assets following the latest crisis. Chart 2.23.A shows that, despite 
the reduction in its financial assets since 2012, banks remain the largest sector in the 
financial system with a volume of approximately €2.5 trillion.21 The banking sector currently 
20  The other sectors include financial auxiliaries (such as securities brokers, appraisal firms, mutual guarantee 
companies and clearing and settlement institutions and the headquarters of financial groups) and captive 
financial institutions and money lenders (such as holding companies or issuers of preferred shares).
21  Financial assets generally include cash and various financial instruments held under assets on the balance 
sheet, excluding tangible fixed assets. The full definition is given in paragraph 11 of IAS 32 and Rule 19, 
paragraph 4 of Banco de España Circular 4/2017.
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represents around 66% of the total financial system (after reaching 71% in 2012), insurance 
companies represent 8%, pension funds 4% and other financial entities have a combined 
share of 22%. All the segments increased their size in the pre-crisis period, especially 
banks and other financial entities. As from 2009, only the insurance companies and pension 
funds increased their size, whereas the banking sector and other financial entities began to 
shrink. The weight of the three non-banking sectors in the financial system rose in recent 
years owing to the decrease of the banking sector (from 2012 to 2018 the weight of other 
financial entities increased by approximately 1 pp and that of insurance companies and 
pension funds by 2 pp).  
Within the other financial entities sector, other financial intermediaries led the growth of 
this segment before the crisis and then significantly decreased their volume of financial 
assets afterwards; the relative share of non-monetary investment funds and specialised 
lending institutions (SLIs) has increased since 2012. Based on the Financial Accounts 
classifications, Chart 2.23.B shows the changes in the financial assets of i) SLIs, ii) money 
market funds, iii) non-monetary investment funds, iv) other financial intermediaries,22 and 
v) other institutions. The size of other financial intermediaries increased considerably in the 
period 2002-2012 and decreased subsequently, in 2018 it was close to its size in 2005. Non-
monetary investment funds together with SLIs (which grew 21%) are the only institutions 
which have increased their size in recent years. These institutions grew by 114% from 2012 
to 2018, although they represent a small percentage of the total financial system (8% in 2018).
The interconnections within the financial system may help to absorb risks, but may 
also act as contagion channels, and need to be quantified. The relationships between 
financial entities may be direct (for example, through loans or holdings of instruments, 
owned by certain institutions, which were issued by other institutions) or indirect (through 
investments in assets or similar non-financial sectors). Furthermore, certain insurance 
companies, pension funds or other financial entities may be part of banking groups, which 
creates additional channels for the pass-through of shocks from one sector to another, 
22  The other financial intermediaries category includes broker-dealers, securitisation special purpose entities 
(structured financial vehicles), venture capital firms, bank asset funds, central counterparties and asset 
management companies (including Sareb), in addition to other entities.
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AND POTENTIAL 
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
The Spanish financial system continues to be a strongly banked one, despite the reduction in bank assets in the post-crisis years. The institutions whose 
volume has most increased in recent years are non-monetary investment funds.
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because the group may bail out its ailing members. The links between the various segments 
of Spain’s financial system were analysed using a subgroup of the other financial entities, 
in line with data on interconnections included in the exercise of the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB). This subgroup is denoted other financial institutions (OFIs).23 
23  The interconnections analysed in the FSB exercise focus on the direct intra-sectoral relationships and are measured 
as the volume of assets and liabilities held by each type of institution vis-à-vis other types of institutions. All the 
direct interconnections data are based on information available in the Financial Accounts. The sector called “Other 
Financial Institutions” (OFIs) should not be confused with the “Other Financial Intermediaries” sector in the Financial 
Accounts which represents only a part of the OFIs. The OFIs subgroup includes (monetary and non-monetary) 
investment funds, specialised lending institutions and the category of other financial intermediaries, according to 
its breakdown in the Financial Accounts (which is described in the previous section).
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The chart shows the interconnections between the different sectors of the financial system. The size of the circles is proportionate to the size of the sector and the 
thickness of the arrows proportionate to the scale of interconnections (the volume of direct exposures that each sector has vis-à-vis the others). The abbreviations 
OFIs, ICs and PFs refer to Other Financial Institutions, Insurance Companies and Pension Funds.
The banking sector plays a central role and is mainly connected to other financial institutions.
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The most important interconnections arise between the banking sector and the OFIs. 
Chart 2.24 shows the central role played by the banking sector in Spain within the financial 
system overall. In turn, it can be seen that the most interconnected segment to banks is that 
of OFIs, with both asset and liabilities-side positions on the balance sheet contributing to this 
interconnection. None of the sectors has direct exposure to pensions funds since these 
institutions do not issue liability instruments that other sectors may acquire, rather they are 
financed by the contributions of pension fund members.
Banks’ exposure to OFIs and to insurance companies through their assets is 
concentrated in fixed-income securities and shareholdings, respectively, whereas the 
connections through their liabilities arise mostly from deposits for all types of non-bank 
financial institutions. Chart 2.25 shows how most of banks’ exposures to OFIs are through 
debt securities (72%), followed by loans (8%) and shares and other equity in investment 
funds (3%). Other instruments (the difference between the total and the three above-
mentioned categories) represent 16% of the total. Exposures to insurance companies are 
concentrated in shares (56%) and loans (44%). Panels A to C of Chart 2.26 show how deposits 
held by the other sectors at banks represent most of banks’ total exposure on the liabilities 
side (56.1% to insurance companies and 95.7% to OFIs) and debt securities also have 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Data referring to September 2018.
The deposits held by the other sectors at banks are the main form of banks’ liability positions vis-à-vis the non-bank financial sector. OFIs’ exposures and 
liabilities to banks account for close to 15% of their assets.
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a notable weight of approximately 25% in the case of liabilities vis-à-vis insurance companies 
and pension funds. 
OFIs’ connections to banks, insurance companies and pension funds are smaller in 
volume than banks’ connections but they represent a higher percentage of OFIs’ total 
assets. Chart 2.26.D shows that OFIs’ exposures in terms of assets and liabilities vis-à-vis 
banks represent around 15% of OFIs’ assets in 2018. However, their connections with the 
other sectors have a smaller weight of less than 2.5% of their assets. Over time, OFIs’ 
exposures to banks peaked at more than 21% of their total assets in 2013 and from then 
onwards they began to decrease until 2018.
In short, banks are the most significant institutions in terms of size within Spain’s 
financial system and the interconnections between the banking sector and the 
other financial sectors are relatively small, especially when they are measured in 
terms of the banking sector’s size. However, in order to have a complete image of the 
interconnections between the banking sector and the non-banking financial sectors, it will 
also be necessary to analyse the activity of agents domiciled abroad which perform cross-
border transactions with Spain’s domestic sector. Additionally, although the banks’ exposure 
to other sectors seems contained, it is necessary to perform a regular monitoring of changes 
in these links and complement it with an analysis of the indirect interconnections and the 
vulnerabilities that they may trigger in relation to financial stability. This section will report 
regularly on the aforementioned analysis. Lastly, it will be important to perform an in-depth 
analysis of the behaviour of the financial system’s various components vis-à-vis possible 
shocks in order to identify possible risk propagation channels which require special attention.
The costs associated with operational risk have increased significantly in recent years. 
Operational risk is defined by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) as the risk 
of loss at institutions resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and 
systems or from external events. This definition includes legal risk, but excludes strategic 
and reputational risk. The increase in these costs was widespread across jurisdictions and is 
related to the increase in litigation, unfavourable court decisions and sanctions imposed on 
deposit-taking institutions following the crisis (legal risk), as well as to technological change 
taking place in the sector (technological risk) which gives rise to specific needs associated 
with replacing infrastructures and digitalisation.
The legal costs of bank misconduct have increased significantly since the start of the 
financial crisis both for European and US banks. Chart 2.27.A shows the estimated volume 
of costs associated with conduct risks in the period 2011-2015 for the main European and US 
international banking groups. As can be seen, these costs were higher in the United States 
than in Europe but were heavy in both cases and represented a significant percentage of net 
profit for the banking groups in both geographical areas. These developments were also 
highlighted by the ESRB, which identified a rising trend in conduct costs at global and 
European level from 2009 to 2015.24 The information available for the period 2016-2018 
reveals that misconduct costs continue to be a significant component of operational costs25 
24  ESRB “Report on misconduct Risk in the banking sector 2015” available at https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/
pdf/other/150625_report_misconduct_risk.en.pdf
25  Comparing CCP Research Foundation conduct cost estimates for large international banking groups in the 
periods 2012-2016 and 2011-2015, costs in 2016 were comparable to those in 2015 but lower than the highs 
of 2014. The responses of European banks to the Risk Assessment Questionnaire included in the EBA’s “Risk 
Assessment of the European Banking System” (RAEBS) shows a significant portion of European banks expect 
legal costs to grow in 2016-2017. See, for example, Section 6.2 of the EBA report at https://eba.europa.eu/
documents/10180/2518651/Risk_Assessment_Report_December_2018.pdf
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and several significant cases of money laundering26 were detected in Europe 
in 2018. 
The information from the EBA’s transparency exercise shows that provisions for legal 
issues and tax litigation consume a significant portion of European banks’ net 
operating income, with heterogeneity across countries. The data used by the EBA 27 
extend the sample of banks and European countries considered to cover more than the 
main banking groups. This measurement of costs is different to that presented in the 
previous paragraph since it includes provisions for legal costs. These provisions reflect 
banks’ anticipation of future expenses which may differ from the expenses finally incurred. 
Provisions for legal expenses averaged 2.4% of net operating income for the period 2014-
2017, however, this percentage ranged from 6% in the United Kingdom to 0.6% in France 
(Chart 2.27.B).
The forward-looking analysis in the EBA’s 2018 stress test includes operational risk as 
a significant risk factor, with misconduct costs representing more than half of the risk 
impact under the adverse scenario. The high legal expenses observed recently for the 
European banking sector do not necessarily indicate that they will remain at these levels in 
the future and it is necessary to conduct forward-looking exercises to obtain reasonable 
projections and gauge plausible adverse scenarios. The EBA’s approach in its 2018 stress 
test combines banks’ internal projections with conservative floors based on historical 
experience. Aggregate operational risk losses under the adverse scenario are €82 billion 
(with a negative impact on the CET1 ratio of 100 bp) for the period 2018-2020. 
26  The EBA’s 2018 RAEBS points out five significant cases of money laundering and violation of anti-corruption 
laws in 2017-2018 which affect banks in central and northern Europe and amount to €3.5 billion in terms of 
expenses and higher capital requirements.
27 T he data of the EBA’s transparency exercise are available at: https://eba.europa.eu/risk-analysisand-data/eu-
wide-transparency-exercise/2018/results
SOURCES: CCP Research Foundation, SNL Financial and EBA.
a The panel combines data on expenses associated with misconduct estimated by CCP Research Foundation for large European banking groups (Lloyds, Barclays, 
RBS, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, BNP Paribas, Santander, Commerzbank, Societe Generale, Standard Chartered, ING) and for large US banking groups (Bank of 
America, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs) with net profit data obtained from SNL Financial.
b Annual data for the period 2014-2017 based on information from the EBA’s transparency exercises. The data for each country relate to a group of significant 
institutions which may vary each year.
The costs associated with misconduct by the major US and European banking groups have been heavy in recent periods. In addition, in the period from 
2014 to 2017, European banks set aside notable provisions for legal expenses and tax lawsuits, with cross-country heterogeneity evident.
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Of this amount, conduct risk losses total €54 billion under the adverse scenario (65% of the 
total impact of operational risk).28 The results of this exercise for individual banks also show 
considerable heterogeneity.
In its review of operational risk, the BCBS changed its formula for calculating operational 
risk capital requirements. Specifically, the possibility of using internal models was eliminated 
and a standardised model was adopted whereby each bank’s experience of operational risk 
losses can be considered in proportion to its turnover. Generally, the higher the operational 
risk losses of each bank over a relatively long period of years, the higher its capital requirements.
In the specific case of the Spanish banking sector, there are indications that the 
operational cost associated with legal risks is a material risk factor. Spanish banks are 
facing a potential increase in legal action due to outstanding litigation, such as that relating 
to the use of the mortgage loan benchmark index (IRPH, by its Spanish abbreviation) in 
mortgage loans. In fact, various lawsuits about the legality of using the mortgage loan 
benchmark index as a reference rate for setting the variable interest rate on mortgage loans 
has led to a question being referred for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU. The CJEU’s 
response, expected for the second half of 2019, may prompt an increase in legal action 
concerning this matter and affect the expected legal cost of this action for banks. The 
potential impact on Spanish banks would be quite diverse, given their varied use of this 
type of contract. Experience in previous lawsuits, particularly those on mortgage floor 
clauses, indicates that these legal processes may be of significant complexity and 
considerable duration, as well as having a material impact of banks’ profits. Specifically, it 
is estimated than more than €2.2 billion were refunded to customers until January 2019 as 
a result of floor clause-related litigation, the greatest impact was on banks’ earnings due to 
the provisioning of €1.9 billion in 2016.29
Financial institutions’ operations are underpinned by infrastructure networks whose 
configuration has material economic effects on the institutions that use them, 
impacting, for example, operational risks and the availability of information. The main 
infrastructures are payment systems, settlement systems and central counterparties 
(CCPs). As a result of the regulatory changes following the 2008 crisis, most of the volume 
of derivatives and equity instruments trading was transferred from OTC markets to the 
CCPs. Box 2.2 analyses in detail how CCPs operate.
Brexit poses some risks for how CCPs operate but mitigating measures have been 
adopted both in Europe and in Spain. One of the main CCPs is located in the United 
Kingdom and, consequently, Brexit could represent a significant risk for European banks 
which operate with it. However, the European Commission recently decided to broaden 
qualified CCP status so they may operate with European financial institutions.30 
28  The aggregate results on operational risk are included in Section 4.1.4 of the EBA’s 2018 EU-wide Stress Test 
Results at: https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2419200/2018-EU-wide-stress-test-Results.pdf
29  Litigation relating to mortgage floor clauses is described in Box 2.2 of the May 2017 Financial Stability Report. 
The fall in the EURIBOR from 2008 activated these contract clauses which limited the pass-through of the 
lower level of the EURIBOR to the effective rate applicable to mortgages. As a consequence of the activation 
of these clauses, lawsuits were brought which followed a protracted process and passed through various 
appeal courts until they reached the Supreme Court. Under the Supreme Court judgment 241/2013 of 9 May 
2013, floor clauses were found to be null and void non-retroactively. Subsequently, in its judgment of 21 
December 2016, the CJEU ruled that the non-retroactivity of the clause in judgment 241/2013 is not in 
accordance with EU law and extended the effects of its judgment to all mortgages with floor clauses and thus 
amplified its quantitative impact.
30  In December 2018 the European Commission issued an implementing decision determining, for a limited period 
of time, that the regulatory framework applicable to CCPs in the United Kingdom is equivalent to that existing 
for CCPs within the European Union in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
2.3.2  VULNERABILITIES  
AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
RISKS
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BOX 2.2 CENTRAL CLEARING COUNTERPARTIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY
Central clearing counterparties1 (CCPs) are financial entities that 
interpose themselves, in their own name, in financial instrument 
trades; they become a seller to each buyer and a buyer to each 
seller. Once a transaction is registered in the CCP, it simultaneously 
gives rise to a purchase operation and a sale operation, with both 
having the CCP as a counterparty. The CCP therefore assumes all 
the rights and obligations derived from both transactions, exposing 
itself to the counterparty risk both with the purchaser and with the 
original seller. Market risk, however, is zero. 
The CCP shields itself from counterparty risk through a set of lines 
of defence. These include strict controls to gain access to clearing 
member status (and to be able to operate as such with the CCP), 
and a series of financial resources available to cover the losses 
caused by potential default by a member. These resources are, in 
the main, provided by the members in the form of guarantees 
backing positions (initial and variation margins) and of contributions 
to a fund for defaults (through which the CCP mutualises the 
losses among all the members). The CCP set aside a buffer of its 
own capital (known as “skin in the game”), whose volume is 
relatively insignificant compared with the members’ contributions. 
Set against bilateral clearing, centralised clearing offers a series of 
potential benefits, both for participants and for the system as a 
whole. The main benefit is the enhanced capacity to reduce the 
aggregate exposure of members (and, therefore, the market and 
counterparty risk to which they are exposed) by means of the 
netting of the positions of the opposite sign that are registered in 
their name (as the CCP is counterparty to all the transactions). 
If a member defaults, netting also allows the position that is to be 
closed or transferred to be smaller, thereby lessening its potential 
impact on prices and market volatility. It also reduces the cost of 
providing collateral and capital allocation (if the member were a bank). 
Centralised clearing also simplifies processes and adds 
transparency, by replacing the complex network of market 
relationships with bilateral clearing in a system that turns on a 
single entity (see Diagram A). This makes it easier for members to 
evaluate their positions and it strengthens prudent risk 
management, given that members are mainly exposed to an entity 
that is highly supervised and regulated. 
From the standpoint of the authorities, centralised clearing 
simplifies the evaluation of market participants’ exposure and, 
therefore, provides for swift decision-making in the face of a bout 
of tension. The CCP has specific processes for managing defaults, 
and these can contribute to reducing contagion risk and domino 
effects should, for example, a large member fail. 
These advantages became manifest during the global financial 
crisis, in which centrally cleared markets proved relatively stable.2 
As a result, the G 20 leaders undertook in 2009 to require, among 
other measures, the centralised clearing of standardised OTC 
derivatives. This agreement has entailed a significant increase in 
centralised clearing activity. In 2018, for example, 76% of interest-
rate derivatives (under the swaps and FRAs categories) were 
centrally cleared, compared with 17% in 2007 (see Chart A).3 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The left panel shows a bilateral clearing network, with each arrow pointing from borrower to lender. The right panel shows a CCP network that groups for each 
member all its bilateral positions in the left panel into a single net position with the CCP. For instance, member A holds lending (borrowing) bilateral positions for 
a total of 65 (95), resulting in a net position of (30).
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1  This box is based on the article “Central Clearing Counterparties: 
benefits, costs and risks”, Nuñez S. and E. Valdeolivas, forthcoming in 
the Financial Stability Review, Banco de España (May 2019).
2  At the time of its collapse, the US bank Lehman Brothers had an 
outstanding position of $9 trillion, corresponding to 66,390 
transactions, in LCH.Clearnet Ltd (United Kingdom). This CCP 
concentrated approximately 50% of the total interest rate swaps 
market, and it had 20 members (all banks) in the swaps segment. The 
collapse was resolved through the auctioning of its positions and the 
use of the collateral provided by Lehman Brothers, without any other 
member posting losses [see Monnet, C. (2010). Let’s make it clear: 
How Central Counterparties save(d) the day, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia, Business Review Q1 2010; and Gregory, J. (2014). 
Central Counterparties: mandatory central clearing and initial margin 
requirements for OTC derivatives. John Wiley & Sons, June 2014].
3  Total interest rate derivatives account for approximately 81% of total 
traded OTC derivatives.
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BOX 2.2CENTRAL CLEARING COUNTERPARTIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY (cont’d)
This high volume of activity, combined with the fact that CCPs 
concentrate that risk in a single entity (which can potentially be 
redistributed through the fund for defaults, for example), explains 
their systemic nature. This systematicity can, in turn, be reinforced 
by the following characteristics observed in centralised clearing: 
the concentration of activity at the level of the CCP and of members; 
and the high interconnections, owing to the presence of common 
members. The failure of a CCP may, therefore, expose the system 
to high losses if the risks are not appropriately managed. 
Chart B shows the market share of the main CCPs in the swaps 
segment, on the basis of currencies and geographical areas.
Operations are essentially concentrated in LCH.Clearnet Ltd, 
with the exception of activity in Latin America (CME Clearing 
(US)) and in yen (JSCC (JP)). This tendency is also observed in 
the CDSs segment, where ICE Clear US is predominant. 
From the members’ standpoint, 75% of activity is concentrated in 
around 20 entities (most of them banks). Chart C shows, for the 
swaps segment, the percentage of the aggregate initial margin 
(a proxy of activity) deposited by the five biggest members of the 
three CCPs most active in this segment. This percentage ranges 
from 24% to 69%. Chart E shows the high presence of banks in 
relation to the other clearing members. 
The risk entailed for a CCP of being highly exposed to certain 
members is mitigated by the internationally recommended 
requirement. This stipulates that the guarantee fund should be of 
a size equivalent, at least, to the losses that might be generated by 
the member with the highest exposure in extreme but plausible 
market conditions.4 
SOURCES: BIS (Semiannual Derivative Statistics), Clarus FT, CPMI-IOSCO (Quantitative disclosure 2018 Q3), ISDA.
a Swap data also include FRAs. The data for 2016-2018 were extracted from the BIS. Data prior to 2016 were estimated by indexing the rate of change of the 
percentages reported by ISDA to the data reported by the BIS. The series were adjusted by the possible double counting of BIS data.
b Swap data also include FRAs.
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4  In the globally systemic CCPs, the size of the fund should be big 
enough to cover the losses of the two biggest members.
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The European Commission’s initiative on CCPs is in addition to Royal Decree-Law 
5/2019 of 1 March 2019, approved by the Spanish government to ensure the continuity 
of financial contracts in case of a disorderly Brexit. Royal Decree-Law 5/2019 approves 
the Spanish Government’s contingency plans in the event of a no-deal Brexit scenario, 
including a requirement that British financial institutions operating in Spain adapt to national 
regulations as well as a transitional arrangement to facilitate this adaptation without 
disrupting operations. The mitigation of this risk has been strengthened with the European 
Council’s recent agreement to delay Brexit until 31 October.
The Eurosystem’s Vision 2020 strategy includes the consolidation of the two largest 
European financial market infrastructures, TARGET2 (T2) and TARGET2-Securities 
(T2S), which is planned for November 2021. The Eurosystem owns both infrastructures 
and is responsible for their management and operations.
T2 is a centralised platform of real time gross settlement (RTGS) for large-value 
payments. Central and commercial banks can send euro-denominated payment orders to 
T2 for processing and settlement in central bank money (cash held by banks in accounts at 
central banks). The system settles payment orders of interbank trading, Eurosystem 
monetary policy operations and operations of banks participating in the system. Furthermore, 
the cash balances arising from operations in most euro area clearing and settlement 
systems are settled in T2.
From a legal standpoint, T2 is structured as a set of national payment systems, each 
one corresponding to a euro area central bank. Furthermore, certain central banks in the 
EU whose currency is not the euro participate in T2. The Spanish component, TARGET2-
Banco de España (T2-BE) is the main payments system in Spain in terms of amounts 
processed. Most Spanish banks participate directly or indirectly in T2-BE. 
T2S is a pan-European platform which facilitates the centralised settlement of securities 
operations denominated in euro and in other currencies of central bank money. It brings 
securities and cash accounts together in the same platform, offering an integrated, neutral 
and borderless settlement service with highly advanced functionalities. The cash from 
securities operations is settled in dedicated cash accounts held by institutions in T2S. 
Functionalities exist which allow institutions to manage liquidity efficiently across T2S and T2. 
The service offered by the T2S platform is aimed at central securities depositories (CSDs) and 
based on a framework agreement entered into by the Eurosystem and the CSDs. The latter 
maintain the business and contractual relationship with their participants. 
BOX 2.2 CENTRAL CLEARING COUNTERPARTIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY (cont’d)
CCPs are, by their nature, entities that are highly interconnected to 
the rest of the financial system. True, CCPs can link up with one 
another through interoperability agreements; but these are scarce 
in practice. That said, there is a notably high presence of common 
members and services providers, some of which globally systemic 
banks (G-SIBs). In particular, the 26 main CCPs (domiciled in 15 
jurisdictions) are, generally, exposed to at least 10 G-SIBs. 
Centralised clearing has the potential to strengthen financial 
stability. However, it poses elements of systemic risk that must be 
addressed. Given this concern, regulators have expended 
considerable effort in reinforcing the soundness and resilience of 
CCPs. Recently, the focus has been on developing robust recovery 
and resolution arrangements to mitigate the impact that the 
potential failure of a CCP would have on financial stability. 
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The T2 and T2S consolidation project comprises the technical and functional 
integration of the two infrastructures in a common platform which will save 
maintenance costs, modernise T2 services and improve connectivity and security 
components through a single point of access for all Eurosystem infrastructures. The 
messages used for communication will follow the ISO 20022 standard. Consolidation will 
provide a centralised tool enabling participants to manage, administer and monitor liquidity 
in all TARGET services: the new RTGS service, T2S and the Target Instant Payment 
Settlement Service (TIPS). The new RTGS system allows settlement of interbank payments 
and those from linked settlement systems not only in euro (as currently occurs in T2) but 
also in other currencies, if the corresponding issuing central bank so decides. 
Owing to the breadth of the changes involved in the consolidation, it is impossible for 
the new system arising from consolidation to coexist alongside the current system. 
Consequently the migration will be through a “Big Bang” approach for all participants. 
Each T2 participant is responsible for ensuring that it is ready, for drawing up an adaptation 
plan and earmarking the necessary funds to the project. 
Since 2018 the Spanish banking system has been preparing its adaptation to this 
operational change, which could have a significant operational impact if the adaptation 
plans are not adequate. Spanish banks formalised their internal adaptation plans at end-
2018 in order to conduct testing and perform the accreditation process by the deadlines. 
Those institutions which do not achieve accreditation in time will have to assume the risk of 
being unable to access central bank money and will forego their status as direct participants 
in the system, at least temporarily. If the Spanish market in general, or certain institutions 
with large settlement volumes in T2, are unable to connect to the platform on the date 
envisaged, the negative impact on the ability of these institutions and the financial system, 
as a whole, to function as normal would be high, since the cash involved in Spain’s large 
volume financial transactions is settled in the T2-BE system.

